Abstract-Modern electricity markets conduct a twosettlement procedure. Ahead of time, they allocate definite supply as well as reserves. Close to the time of consumption, they balance supply and demand. Bidding in these two auctions poses a challenge for automated bidding by agents, which will be more common in future electricity markets and so-called "smart grids". In a decision-theoretic model, we implement the current bidding practice that uses two independent bids and a novel, unified format that simplifies computation. We show through Monte-Carlo simulations in one-shot settings that the unified format restricts market power of suppliers in exploitable settings, and is also less vulnerable to uncertainty of bidders about market outcomes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principal engineering challenge in power systems is to keep costs of production low and to maintain a constant balance between supply and demand. The ongoing deregulation of electricity markets adds the challenge to increase competition in markets with (currently) high concentration of market power at the suppliers. At the same time, both more volatile generation methods (e.g. renewables) as well as more flexible technological components are being introduced, while electricity remains difficult to store. Based on these developments, the "smart grid" concept envisions more dynamic pricing and more decisions made close to the time of consumption. Intelligent agents can potentially take over many planning decisions and place bids in the name of their owners. but for this an advancement in the understanding of the dynamics and proposals for computationally efficient mechanisms are needed.
This work builds on a type of market allocation mechanism that combines ahead-planning with dynamic pricing. The two-settlement procedure, which is currently being used in many deregulated electricity markets, trades a continuous good (electricity) in two different markets. The first settlement clears an "ahead market" (usually one day ahead of time, but shorter intervals are possible in more dynamic market settings, e.g. in "smart grids"). Generators submit a bid to sell some quantity definitively. The ahead market also allocates an additional quantity from generators, but only as an option. The second settlement clears a "balancing market". Generators submit a bid in order to sell some part of this option to even out short-term imbalances.
Specifically, fast-reacting generators like gas power plants or batteries will become more valuable, in order to act as reserve power in the balancing market. It is, however, not settled how to allocate quantities and prices for balancing markets. Is the quantity of needed reserves chosen independently from the quantity of definitely allocated power? Should power only be paid for when it is used for balancing or should the market pay for the availability of fast-startable reserve capacity, regardless of whether it is put to use? This paper uses a version of the two-settlement procedure in which the market maker allocates reserve capacity relative to definitely allocated capacity and dynamically sets prices for electricity which is actually used for balancing.
Bidding in the two-settlement procedure is complex and it is not well-understood how intelligent agents would perform. In a decision-theoretic model, we investigate the profit maximisation problem of a generator on an ahead market (that is part of the two-settlement procedure) and its effects on market prices and the market power of the generator. In a parallel companion work [4] to this work, we investigate the suitability of this format for a flexible consumer.
We advance the state of the art in the following ways: First, we extensively model the decision problem for a smart bidding agent (who is able to offer reserve capacity to the balancing market) in the two-settlement model by implementing the current practice, where separate bids are made for definitively sold power and reserve power. Second, we implement a unified bid format that was proposed by the authors in [5] into this model. The format simplifies the optimisation problem of the bidding agent substantially. Finally, we study varying what-if scenarios with stochastic Monte-Carlo simulations. Experimental evidence shows that the combined format is appealing to market makers, as it restricts the exercise of excessive market power by bidders in exploitable market settings (compared to a non-unified approach). It is also appealing to bidders, as it shows a good performance in all other settings and is less vulnerable to increasing uncertainty about market outcomes.
II. BACKGROUND
Modern electricity markets are centralised, two-sided multi-unit auctions, which are challenging to analyse. They have often used uniform-price auctions (UPA) designs, in which all participants pay or earn the same unit price. The last decade has seen more markets designed as discriminatory pricing auctions (DPA) [7] , in which unit prices may differ based on individual bids. Generally, UPA settings have been found to result in more efficient allocations, but DPA designs lower prices and market power of suppliers, see for example Fabra et al. (2002) [3] and Damianov et al. (2010) [2] . This paper models a DPA design.
A very common (e.g. [6] , [1] , [14] ) mathematical model of bids in electricity markets are supply functions, based on a quadratic representation of total production costs: f (Q) = cQ + RQ n . This makes the assumption that there are no fixed costs. Q denotes a quantity of electricity and c ∈ R and R ∈ R are coefficients. Also, c > 0, R > 0 and n > 1.
Market power, defined as "the ability to alter profitably prices away from competitive levels" [9] , lies currently mainly with suppliers, who face inelastic demand. To tackle this problem, electricity market designers have been searching for the best trade-off in bid format design, which allows bidders to freely express their economic preferences, but also restricts them artificially in order to limit prices and the exercise of market power. For instance, Baldick (2002) [1] mentions that quadratic terms in the bids could be limited or bids could be required to be consistent across time.
In the two-settlement procedure described above, the market maker procures reserve energy. The required optimal quantity is currently chosen by static heuristics, for example based on the capacity of the largest power plant, by remaining capacity in allocated generation facilities, or on a percentage of peak capacity in the market. Although they are delivered together as an indistinguishable product, definitive and reserve electricity are priced independently. An important question is when to submit the supply bids for each type. Most scientific literature favours simultaneous approaches (submit at the same time) over sequential ones (submit bids for reserve electricity after the market for definitive electricity has been cleared). In sequential approaches, recommitments can lead to inefficient allocations.
However, a problem with simultaneous approaches is that a bid in one market cannot refer to outcomes in the other market. This reduces chances of reaching efficient allocations. Only few proposals to tackle this problem exist. For example, Virag et al. (2011) [15] propose an iterative market design, where in each round the market maker proposes two market prices and the market participants update the quantities they would sell or buy at those prices. This runs until conversion, but the runtime properties of this dynamic method are uncertain. The problem has also been discussed in Höning et al. (2011) [5] , where a combined bid format is proposed for the two-settlement procedure which allocates reserve quantities relative to definitely sold quantities. and a preliminary market clearing mechanism was sketched as constraint satisfaction problem. This paper analyses the performance of this bid format as described in Section I, from the viewpoint of a bidder.
III. MODEL
We consider a generator g using a decision-theoretic approach. g aims at maximising profits from selling electricity in the two markets and his task is to construct appropriate bids for this. In this section, we describe the mathematical form of bids, the ahead market A, the balancing market B and g's profit maximisation problem.
A. Mathematical form of bids
We denote the maximal production capacity of any generator h with Q U h and h's total cost function by
where Q is a quantity of electricity. In our market model, bids are supply functions and map unit prices to quantities (to model the current practice, market B also accepts a constant price bid, see Section IV). A bid by generator h is a linear function. It is based on C h −1 , the inverse derivative of the total cost function C h , wherein h can adapt the minimal offer price per unit c h . First, C h −1 is derived as follows: Let C h be the derivative of C h and ρ m be the marginal unit cost related to a quantity of power Q (i.e. ρ m equals the costs of the last produced unit). Then,
and represents the profit-maximising bid in a perfectly competitive market [12] . For comparison, the average unit cost function is the inverse of
, where ρ t is the average unit cost. Second, h can construct a bid b h in order to maximise profits by deviating from both his c h and R h value. For simplicity, we fix R h and restrict h to adapt only the parameter c h . We represent this by:
, where ρ is a unit price and c * h is the parameter that h can freely choose. In [1] , this restriction of the function parametrisation is called "cparametrisation" and previous literature that also used this restriction is described.
B. The two markets
Let the overall offered quantity be Q U . Each generator h submits bids b This work models the decision problem of one generator agent g. In both markets, we model the residual demand function D g that g effectively faces, given demand and supply from all other market participants. The residual demand is the full market demand minus the quantity supplied by other generators at each unit price ρ [12] . Thus, let D(ρ) → R be an aggregated demand function and S −g (ρ) → R an aggregated supply function, where S −g aggregates all generators besides g.
Following [12] , the latter functions are given by:
where D max denotes the maximal demand (if price is zero), α denotes the slope of D, ρ min denotes the minimal unit offer price and β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the slope of S −g . D g is given by:
Market clearing works as follows: Given g's bid b g , the quantity Q g that g sells and the unit price ρ b that g earns are found at the intersection of residual demand and g's bid,
. However, we also need to consider outcomes of this intersection that would lead to invalid quantities (quantities which g is not able to produce). g can not produce negative quantities, so if D g (ρ b ) < 0, g sells nothing, as his bid b g was too expensive. Furthermore, we model an individual maximal capacity constraint Q max g for b g (for S −g , we assume that individual capacity constraints of the aggregated suppliers are not exceeded and thus not relevant for the market clearing). g is willing to sell Q max g
) and the SO is willing to pay Figure 1 for illustration), we use a discriminative (also called pay-as-bid) auction approach [7] , such that g will sell Q 1−rm . We will evaluate scenarios with different values for r m and assume in this work that g as well as (the aggregation of) other generators are able to ramp up enough of their capacity in time for balancing. In addition, we assume that other generators bid the price they achieved in market A as minimum price in market B, thus ρ
−g , which is a reasonable expectation, because prices for balancing power are usually higher than for power bought on an ahead market [11] 
C. The profit maximisation problem g has two bids to construct (we call them b 
Then, the profit functions are:
where Q arg max
IV. BID FORMATS In the reference format (which we call BEN CH), g submits two independent bids: a bid b 
), the SO then constructs bid b (9)). The UNI format reduces the complexity of g's optimisation problem by one dimension to only one bid b g and thus simplifies the computation that a bidding agent has to perform: 
V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
We construct two market scenarios and investigate several settings in each, using a systematic parameter analysis. In each setting, g constructs bids for markets A and B. We then investigate the resulting market outcome via Monte Carlo simulations. To assess the effect of g's decision on the overall market, we measure an aggregated measure of unit prices over both markets combined, dividing the revenue of all suppliers by all sold power:
Furthermore, we want to quantify g's ability to profitably alter prices away from competitive levels. To this end, economists measure the market power of actors. We measure market power by calculating the Lerner index ∈ [0, 1], defined by dividing per-unit profits by unit price. As the index is defined for a monopolist, we multiply it by g's market share [13] :
where ρ g is the average unit price g earns when selling the
), costs g is the average production costs per unit and s m is the market share. In our case:
Besides market power and aggregated unit price, we also measure g's profits, prices ρ 
A. Oligopolistic market scenario
First, we define an oligopolistic market scenario with realistic settings from a wholesale power market simulation study by Sun & Tesfatsion (2007) [14] . In [14] , several generators and a generic buyer profile are described for 24 hours of a day on an electricity wholesale market. In particular, the oligopolistic scenario corresponds to hour 8 in that study (we chose hour 8 as it is similar to most other hours and not an outlier). Because we use settings from a wholesale market study, the prices in our model are in $/M W h -but we note that the general findings of this model can also hold for markets which trade KW h.
We parametrise g as a typical generator, according to [14] . We set c g = 18.8, R g = 0.008 and Q U g = 300.
For the parametrisation for D and S −g on the markets A and B, Table II lists the default setting for this scenario, which we discuss below, as well as variation ranges.
Furthermore, we run simulations with r m = 0.1, which is a reserve level often in use today, as well as r m = 0.3, a setting that is not unrealistic in the market scenarios we can expect in the upcoming 10 years, at least for the generators that can offer significant reserve power.
The sum of the demand of all buyers in [14] is 900, or 3Q [8] of several demand responsiveness studies. All studies in [8] measured the price elasticity of demand, which denotes the percentage change in quantity demanded in response to a one percent change in price. [8] distinguishes between "long-run" and "short-run" demand, where the latter allows less substitution of demanded power by any alternative, similar to the situation in a balancing market. The survey reports price elasticities between 0.7 and 2.1 for "long-run" scenarios (which we use for market A) and between 0.03 and 0.5 in "short-run" scenarios (which we use for market B). We take α A = 1.0 and α
). Furthermore, [14] uses five generators in their model. We assume that all generators have the same slope in their production costs. Thus, we multiply the slope of g's marginal costs by four to get the slope of S −g : β = 
B. Competitive market scenario
To provide an outlook into market scenarios of the upcoming 10 years, we also design a scenario with a competitive market (which is more relevant smart grids), see Table III . We base it on the oligopolistic scenario we described in Section V-A. Here, we assume the number of players on the supply side to be ten times higher and set β = 40 2Rg . Furthermore, we also assume that demand responsiveness is ten times higher and set α A = 10 and α B = 2. Both assumptions are likely approximations, as the number of suppliers as well as the demand responsiveness are very low in current markets and are expected to increase rapidly in future energy systems. Finally, we assume the overall demand to be twice as high and set
This assumption is reasonable, because electricity demand is expected to increase, especially with increasing market 
penetration of electric vehicles. Also, the addition of storage facilities to the power systems is both needed and expected.
C. Method
In order to systematically create parametrised settings in both scenarios, we vary the values of one parameter at a time while the others remain at the default setting. Per parameter, we select 7 evenly-spaced values from a value range. We Tables II and III. For each setting, g constructs either two bids b Starting with the most promising point from the brute force evaluations, g then applies a downhill simplex algorithm [10] to maximise his expected profits.
We sample the outcomes for each setting 100 times and report the average results together with one standard deviation in our graphs. Each sample uses a new pair of the noise parameters k A and k B , generated by the Mersenne twister pseudo-random number generation algorithm. We assume k A and k B to be distributed normally and thus have to choose means and standard deviations in both markets A and B. We set the means to 1 and choose each standard deviation s in the following way: We denote ρ max as the maximal unit price in the market (such that D g (ρ max , 1) = 0). We then define s such that D g (ρ min , 1 + φs) = 0, where ρ min is the minimal price of S −g (see Section III-B) and φ is a scaling parameter (in default settings, φ = 1). The difference of ρ max − ρ min is dependent on the market setting and also differs in markets A and B. Thus, the noise in the market is proportional to the maximal price variation in residual demand. During the the profit maximisation problem, g considers values for k ∈ [k min = 1 − 3s, k max = 1 + 3s].
D. Results
We begin with confirming that, for several general economic properties, the market model behaves as expected in reality. First, g makes profits with both formats and across all settings. Profits also correlate with settings like one would expect. They are positively correlated to changes in R g , D A . Second, g's presence increases competition as he can offer electricity below market price. We simulated the market without g (thus decreasing the number of suppliers by one). As should be expected, the aggregated unit price is significantly higher than with g's presence. Finally, in comparison to the oligopolistic scenario, the competitive scenario has lower aggregated market prices, as well as market power and profits for g.
We now turn to three major observations, concerning notable differences or similarities in outcomes when g uses either the BEN CH or the UNI format:
Observation 1: The UNI format substantially reduces market prices and market power in exploitable settings. In the default settings, the UNI and BEN CH format show no significant 1 differences in market power. Specifically, g is lowering the price ρ A g on market A, and as a result the aggregated market prices are lower than with the BEN CH format (note that the most quantity is sold on market A and thus lowering ρ A g has strong effects). See Figure 2 for the most substantial case, where the presence of g when using the UNI format has an impact on aggregated market prices up to 2.7 times as when g uses the BEN CH format. The results also show a clear reduction in market power. In the default settings (ρ A min = 20.68), g has more market power with the UNI format. However, in settings with ρ A min ≥ 24, g gains substantially less market power with respect to the default setting when using the UNI format and therefore has less market power than with the BEN CH format. See Figure 3 for the most substantial case, where the UNI format has up to 11% less market power.
Observation 2: The UNI format is stable against noise. In the oligopolistic scenario, g has substantial market power due to his position in this less competitive market setting. If g can be less certain about market outcomes due to increasing noise (note that we do not model noise for other market participants), his market power decreases when he is using the BEN CH format, but stays constant (on average) with the UNI format (see Figure 4 for an example).
Observation 3: In all other settings, the UNI format has comparable impacts on overall market outcomes. Although the formats are constructed differently and show distinct bidding behaviour (in the simulated settings not covered in observation 1 and 2, the UNI format sells less Q B g at a higher price ρ B g , see Figure 5 for an example), the impact of g on market prices does not differ significantly 1 when g uses the UNI or BEN CH format (if noise is at least as high as in the default setting). From the perspective of the market, the UNI format thus shows no substantial drawback in these cases.
E. Discussion and future work
Let us first consider why the BEN CH format bids lower prices on market B (see observation 3 and Figure 5 ). Given his bid b for k B = 1. However, in a non-deterministic setting, the BEN CH format bids a price ρ B * g lower than ρ. This also explains observation 2: The higher the uncertainty about market outcomes, the lower g will bid on market B when using the BEN CH format. As the UNI format is bidding a function instead of a constant price, it does not face this problem and has stable market power. This makes the UNI format appealing to bidders, as it is less vulnerable to increasing uncertainty about market outcomes.
We now turn to observation 1 and discuss bidding be- (9)). Thus, it becomes highly unlikely that g can bid optimal prices in both markets. We conclude that under very favourable conditions for g, the UNI format restricts g from realising the full potential market power. As a result, the UNI format lowers bid b A g substantially in order to not overprice on market B. This makes the UNI format appealing to market makers, as it restricts the exercise of excessive market power in exploitable market settings.
The decision-theoretic approach taken in this work gives first insights into this complex problem setting. However, future work could further evaluate the UNI format in a multi-agent setting. By including the decision-making of multiple actors, the social efficiency improvements can be studied in more detail. In addition, certain assumptions may be loosened. First, individual ratios r g per bidder would model a more dynamic market setting. Each bidder would decide how much flexibility he actually can offer, depending on his portfolio as well as adaptive strategies, where for example r g = 0 means that g is not taking part in market B. If suppliers bid on several r g values, the SO can increase market efficiency by choosing among them (see also [5] ). Second, bidders can be allowed to adjust both bid parameters (see Section III-A and one might investigate the usefulness of strategies that rely on this. Finally, it is important to consider the bid format for the demand side, as well. In a companion work (currently under review), which is more tailored to the electrical engineering community, we model a flexible consumer and formulate the problem such that he bids a demand bid on market A and a supply bid on market B, offering to reduce his planned consumption.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work analyses the decision problem of a smart bidding agent in a two-settlement electricity auction. It provides a parametrised, stochastic market model with discriminatory bids. The profit maximisation problem of a generator is formalised and studied with Monte-Carlo simulations and careful parameter analysis. We model the current stateof-the-art bid format and incorporate a novel format that enables simpler computation by agents through unification of the two bids. Experimental simulations show that the unified format restricts market power of suppliers in exploitable market settings, and is also less vulnerable to increasing uncertainty of bidders about market outcomes.
